创业公司：如何闪电扩张
编者按：本文来自微信公众号“ThinkingSlow缓慢思考”（ID：ThinkingSlow），编译愉悦资本戴汨；36氪经授权发布。
原文来自HBR。我一度犹豫要不要翻译，因为文章很长。我还是花了两个晚上翻译整理出来了，原因很简单：霍夫曼是硅谷的人脉王，参与了Paypal、Facebook和Linkedin的创建和投资，他对早期公司扩张的见解值得研究。此外，Wish的创始人Danny大力给我推荐了这篇文章，我想他也是深有体会。闪电扩张的逻辑是：对于很多平台业务，只有具有规模才有价值，只有接触客户才能拥有客户，因此一旦确定了市场机会和产品的契合，就应该不顾一切的扩张，在扩张中解决问题。
Reid Hoffman is one of Silicon Valley’s grown-ups. After helping to found PayPal, he moved on to found LinkedIn, in 2002, which has turned him into a billionaire. He was an early investor in Facebook and now serves as a partner at the venture capital firm Greylock. He’s written two books, The Start-Up of You (with Ben Casnocha) and The Alliance: Managing Talent in the Networked Age (with Casnocha and Chris Yeh).
里德.霍夫曼是在硅谷长大的。在帮助创立PayPal之后，2002年他创立了LinkedIn，这个公司使他成为一名亿万富翁。他还是Facebook的早期投资者，现在是风险投资公司Greylock的合伙人。他写了两本书：“你的创业“ 和 “联盟：网络时代的人才管理”。
In the fall of 2015, Hoffman began teaching a computer science class called Technology-Enabled Blitzscaling at Stanford University, his alma mater, with John Lilly (a partner at Greylock and formerly the CEO of Mozilla), Allen Blue (cofounder of LinkedIn), and Chris Yeh (cofounder of Allied Talent). In this edited interview with Tim Sullivan, the editorial director of HBR Press, Hoffman talks about the challenges, risks, and payoffs of blitzscaling.
2015年秋天，霍夫曼联合约翰（Greylock的合伙人，以前是Mozilla的首席执行官）、艾伦（LinkedIn的联合创始人）和克里斯（Allied Talent联合创始人）开始在他的母校斯坦福大学教授一门计算机课程：技术驱动的闪电扩张。在接受哈佛商业评论编辑Tim Sullivan的这篇采访中，霍夫曼讨论了闪电扩张的挑战、风险和回报。
HBR: Let’s start with the basics. What is blitzscaling?
哈佛商业评论： 我们从基础开始吧。什么是闪电扩张（blitzscaling）？
Hoffman: Blitzscaling is what you do when you need to grow really, really quickly. It’s the science and art of rapidly building out a company to serve a large and usually global market, with the goal of becoming the first mover at scale.
霍夫曼：闪电扩张就是当你需要真正的快速增长时你做的事情。快速建立一家公司，服务于巨大的市场，通常是全球市场，成为规模上的领跑者，这是门科学也是门艺术。
This is high-impact entrepreneurship. These kinds of companies always create a lot of the jobs and industries of the future. For example, Amazon essentially invented e-commerce. Today, it has over 150,000 employees and has created countless jobs at Amazon sellers and partners. Google revolutionized how we find information—it has over 60,000 employees and has created many more jobs at its AdWords and AdSense partners.
这种创业具有极大的影响力。这些公司创造了许多未来的工作和行业。例如，亚马逊本质上是发明了电子商务。今天，它有超过15万名员工，并为卖家和合作伙伴创造了无数工作。 Google彻底改变了我们如何找到信息 — 它有超过6万名员工，并为其AdWords和AdSense合作伙伴创造了更多的工作。
HBR：Why this focus on fast growth?
为什么重点放在快速增长？
We’re in a networked age. And I don’t mean only the internet. Globalization is a form of network. It adds networks of transport, commerce, payment, and information flows around the world. In such an environment, you have to move faster, because competition from anywhere on the globe may beat you to scale.
我们处于网络时代。我说的并不只是互联网。全球化是网络的一种形式。它构建了全球的运输、商业、支付和信息流的网络。在这样的环境中，你必须更快地移动，因为全球任何地方的竞争都可能会击败你。
Software has a natural affinity with blitzscaling, because the marginal costs of serving any size market are virtually zero. The more that software becomes integral to all industries, the faster things will move. Throw in AI machine learning, and the loops get even faster. So we’re going to see more blitzscaling. Not just a little more, but a lot more.
软件天然和闪电扩张相关联，由于软件服务于任何大小的市场的边际成本几乎为零。软件越对任何行业适用，扩张速度就越快。加入AI机器学习，循环很更快。所以我们会看到更多的闪电扩张。不只是多一点点，而是多非常多。
HBR：How did you settle on the term “blitzscaling”?
你如何找到“blitzscaling”这个术语的？
It has some interesting associations. I have obvious hesitations about the World War II association with the term “blitzkrieg.” However, the intellectual parallels are so close that it is very informative. Before blitzkrieg emerged as a military tactic, armies didn’t advance beyond their supply lines, which limited their speed. The theory of the blitzkrieg was that if you carried only what you absolutely needed, you could move very, very fast, surprise your enemies, and win. Once you got halfway to your destination, you had to decide whether to turn back or to abandon the lines and go on. Once you made the decision to move forward, you were all in. You won big or lost big. Blitzscaling adopts a similar perspective. If a start-up determines that it needs to move very fast, it will take on far more risk than a company going through the normal, rational process of scaling up. This kind of speed is necessary for offensive and defensive reasons. Offensively, your business may require a certain scale to be valuable. LinkedIn wasn’t valuable until millions of people joined our network. Marketplaces like eBay must have both buyers and sellers at scale. Payment businesses like PayPal and e-commerce businesses like Amazon have low margins, so they require very high volumes. Defensively, you want to scale faster than your competitors because the first to reach customers may own them, and the advantages of scale may lead you to a winner-takes-most position. And in a global environment, you may not necessarily be aware of who your competition really is.
它有一些有趣的关联。我有些犹豫，因为很明显“闪电战”和“第二次世界大战”相关。但是，闪电战这个词非常形象，意思很接近。在闪电战作为一种军事手段出现之前，军队不会推进超出他们的供应线，这限制了他们的速度。闪电战的理论是，如果你只携带你的必需品，你可以非常快速地移动并且赢得胜利，让敌人为之惊讶。一旦你到达距离目的地一半的时候，你必须决定是否回头或继续前行。一旦你决定向前走，你就置身全部了。你要么大赢要么大输。 闪电扩张采用类似的观点。如果一家初创公司确定需要移动的速度非常快，那么它的风险要高于进行正常扩张的公司大得多。这种速度对于进攻和防守都是必要的。进攻上讲，你的业务可能需要一定的规模才有价值。只有数百万人加入我们的网络，LinkedIn才有价值。像eBay这样的交易市场一定要有买卖双方的规模。像PayPal这样的支付业务和像亚马逊这样的电子商务利润率很低，所以他们需要很大的交易量。防守上讲，你希望比竞争对手更快地扩张，因为首先接触客户才有可能拥有他们，而规模的优势可能会导致你赢者通吃。在全球化的环境中，你可能并不一定了解竞争对手到底是谁。
HBR：Are there several dimensions to the idea of scale?
规模这个概念而言，它有几个不同的维度吗？
There are three kinds of scale. People naturally focus on two of them: growing your revenues and growing your customer base. And of course, if you don’t get those right, then nothing else matters. But very few businesses can succeed on those fronts without also scaling the organization. An organization’s size and its ability to execute determine whether it can capture customers and revenue.
有三种不同的规模。人们一般关注其中两个：增加你的收入和增加客户群。当然，如果你这两个没有搞对，那么其他的都不重要。但很少有企业可以在不扩张组织规模的情况下实现这两个方面。组织的规模和执行力决定公司是否能够获取客户和收入。
We see scale as a series of stages, based on orders of magnitude: A family-scale business can measure its employees in single digits; a tribe in tens; a village in hundreds; a city in thousands. A nation has more than 10,000 employees. These are estimates, not precise guides; a company often remains a family until around 15 employees, a tribe until around 150, and so on. At each level, the way you run various functions—financing the company, hiring and onboarding employees, marketing the product, and so on—changes significantly. There aren’t rules governing this when you’re blitzscaling; you use heuristics instead—and by that I mean guidelines that help you make decisions and learn on the fly. Organizational scale is more about the character of the company than it is an exact employee head count—things don’t change drastically at exactly 150 employees. And you’re not necessarily scaling each element of the firm at the same time or rate. You’re more likely to focus first on customer service and sales than other functions. But even then, you’ll have to blitzscale the other parts of the organization. So all along you really do need to be thinking about the company as a whole: How will you allocate your talent, and then how will you grow it? How will you hold on to your culture? How will you communicate? How will your competitive landscape shift?
我们可以根据数量级将规模分为一系列阶段：家庭规模的业务可以用个位数来度量员工; 一个部落规模数十计； 一个村庄数以百计；一个城市数以千计；一个国家数以万计。这些是估计，不是精确的指导；一家公司在15人以下就像一个家庭， 150人以下就像一个部落，以此类推。在每个层次上，你运营公司各个职能的方式都大相径庭：公司融资，招聘和选择员工，营销产品等等 。当你进行闪电扩张的时候，你没有规则可以依赖。你依靠的是直觉— 我指的是一些帮助你做决策的框架，你一边飞行一边学习。组织规模更多的是关于公司的特点，而不是确切的员工总数 — 到达整150名员工的时候并不会发生什么突变。你不必要同时或者等比的扩张公司的每一个元素。你首先还是更应该关注客户服务和销售，而不是其他功能。但即使如此，组织的其他部分还是需要闪电扩张。所以， 自始至终，你需要把公司当一个整体思考：如何分配你的人才以及如何扩充？如何坚持你的文化？你如何沟通？你的竞争格局将如何变化？
HBR：When does a start-up begin to blitzscale?
初创公司什么时候开始闪电扩张？
At the family scale, you’re usually raising money and figuring out exactly what your product or service is. You most likely have not launched a product yet.At the tribe scale, you’re just starting to have a real company. It’s fairly rare—not unheard of, but rare—for blitzscaling to start at this phase unless you have a runaway hit of a product: PayPal or Instagram, for example. More typically, you’ve launched some version of the product or service, and you’ve homed in on your target market. But you’re still not certain that the start-up can really scale massively. There’s always some level of risk. You may decide not to scale at this stage, because you’re not sure you have a product-market fit yet. Or you may decide to move ahead anyway, because you know you absolutely need to, for the offensive and defensive reasons we just talked about. So the blitzscale process usually starts between the tribe and village scale. By then you’ve ironed out the product-market fit, you have some data, and you know what the competitive landscape looks like. This is when the logic of blitzscaling becomes very clear. Once you begin to prove—to yourself and others—that there’s an interesting category and a big market opportunity, you attract all kinds of competition. At the low end, other start-ups may be launching their own version of your product or service and trying to achieve scale in the market before you. At the high end, established brands are figuring out how to leverage their own assets to own part or all of your space. A start-up has two advantages as a first mover going through blitzscale: focus and speed. Established brands tend not to be as fast or as focused. And competing start-ups probably don’t have momentum yet (although they may be just as fast and focused). The canonical example is Groupon, which made it to this middle stage and got hit by massive competition on both the high and the low ends. It wasn’t able to both scale fast and build a durable product and thus failed to fully realize a potentially industry-transforming opportunity.
在家庭规模上，你通常会筹集资金，并确定你的产品或服务到底是什么。你有可能尚未推出产品。在部落规模上，你刚开始有一家真正的公司。在这个阶段就开始闪电扩张是相当罕见的，除非你有一个火爆的产品，当然也不是没有过这样的例子，例如PayPal或Instagram。更典型地，你已经推出了一些版本的产品或服务，并且你已经在目标市场上站住了。但是，你仍然不确定公司是否应该开始启动大规模扩张。一定程度的风险总是有的。你可能觉得此阶段不进行扩张，因为你不确定产品是否已经契合了市场。或者你可能会决定无论如何要往前跑，因为你知道你必须这么做，由于我们刚才谈到的进攻和防守原因。所以这个闪电扩张的过程通常是在介于部落和村庄这两个阶段之间开始的。那时，你已经解决了产品市场适应性问题，你有了一些数据，你知道竞争格局是什么样的。这时候闪电扩张的逻辑变得非常清楚。一旦你开始向自己和他人证明 — 有一个门类很有趣并且有很大的市场机会，你会吸引各种各样的竞争。在低端，其他初创企业可能会推出自己的产品或服务版本，并试图在市场上实现规模化。在高端，成熟公司试图利用自己的资产来获得部分或全部市场。第一个发动闪电扩张的初创公司有两大优势：专注和速度。成熟公司往往不是那么快或者集中精力。而其他竞争的初创企业可能还没有形成势能（尽管他们也可能同样的快速和专注）。典型的例子是Groupon，它跑到了这个中间阶段，然后遭到了来自高端和低端的巨大的竞争。它无法快速扩张同时建立持久的产品，因此错失了一个潜在的重塑产业的机会。
当进行闪电扩张的时候，你会遇到什么组织问题？
Blitzscaling is always managerially inefficient—and it burns through a lot of capital quickly. But you have to be willing to take on these inefficiencies in order to scale up. That’s the opposite of what large organizations optimize for.
In hiring, for instance, you may need to get as many warm bodies through the door as possible, as quickly as you can—while hiring quality employees and maintaining the company culture. How do you do that? Different companies use different hacks. As part of blitzscaling at Uber, managers would ask a newly hired engineer, “Who are the three best engineers you’ve worked with in your previous job?” And then they’d send those engineers offer letters. No interview. No reference checking. Just an offer letter. They’ve had to scale their engineering fast, and that’s a key technique that they’ve deployed. We faced this issue at PayPal. In early 2000, payment transaction volume was growing at a compounding rate of 2% to 5% per day. That kind of growth put PayPal in a deep hole as far as customer service was concerned. Even though the only place we listed our contact information was in the Palo Alto phone directory, angry customers were tracking down our main number and dialing extensions at random. Twenty-four hours a day, you could pick up literally any phone and talk to an angry customer. So we turned off all our ringers and used our cell phones. But that wasn’t a solution. We knew we needed to build a customer service capacity—fast. But that’s very difficult to do in Silicon Valley. So we decided to scale up in Omaha. This was during the first dot-com boom, so we convinced the governor of Nebraska that he wanted a piece of the internet revolution. He and the mayor held press conferences about how PayPal was going to open a customer service office, prompting a flood of job applicants. For four weekends straight, we flew out about 20% of the company to interview them. People showed up with their résumés, and we’d put them in a room and do group interviews. Within six weeks, we had 100 active customer-service people fielding e-mails. It’s now a classic technique for internet companies to offer e-mail and web-based customer service only. But we had to figure out how to hack our customer service challenge at a very fast pace. There was no playbook to tell us what to do. There still isn’t.
闪电扩张在管理上总是效率低下的，而且会很快烧掉很多资金。但是，为了扩大规模，您必须愿意承担这些低效率。这与大型组织的优化截然相反。
例如，在招聘方面，你可能需要尽可能快地找到尽可能多的人，同时保证质量和维护公司文化。你如何做到这一点？不同的公司使用不同的黑客手段。作为Uber闪电扩张的缩影，经理们会问每一位新聘请的工程师，“你以前在工作中工作过的最好的三位工程师是谁？”然后他们给那些工程师发录取信。没有面试。没有背景调查。只是一个录取信。他们不得不快速扩展工程团队，这是他们采用的手段。我们在PayPal也面临过这个问题。 2000年初，支付交易量以每天2％至5％的复利率增长。就客户服务而言，这种增长使paypal处于深洞中。尽管我们只在Palo Alto的电话簿中列出了我们的联系信息，但愤怒的客户随机追踪了我们的主号码和拨号分机。每天24小时，你可以随时拿起一个电话，都可以和一个愤怒的客户交谈。所以我们拔掉了所有的座机，转而使用我们的手机。但这不是一个解决方案。我们知道我们需要快速建立客户服务能力。但这在硅谷很难做到。所以我们决定在奥马哈扩大规模。当时这是第一次互联网泡沫期间。我们说服了内布拉斯加州州长拥抱互联网革命。他和市长举行了一个新闻发布会，宣布PayPal将设立客户服务办公室，这引发了大量的求职者。连续四个周末，公司20％的人都飞出去面试他们。人们带着简历过来，我们把他们安排在一个房间里进行集体面试。在六个星期内，我们招募到了100名活跃的客服人员处理电子邮件。现在，对互联网公司而言，利用电子邮件和网络服务处理客户服务已经是一种经典技术。当时那个时候，我们必须弄清楚如何以非常快的速度处理客户服务挑战。没有任何手册来告诉我们该做什么。那时还没有。
如果没有规则，你们怎么想出方法来？
Sometimes freedom from normal rules is what gives you competitive advantage. For example, if we had understood how pernicious credit card fraud and chargebacks were in the early days at PayPal, I’m not sure we would have believed that such a service could be successful. We didn’t realize how staggering the losses could be. All the banking people knew the rules—you had to protect against fraud first. That prevented them from trying anything that looked remotely like PayPal. Our ignorance allowed us to build something fast, but then of course we had to fix it on the run, because we were already in the minefield. Most critics thought we were losing so much money in 2000 because of our customer acquisition bonuses. But that wasn’t the case. The industry’s average customer-acquisition cost through advertising was around $40. So when we gave customers who recommended a friend 10 bucks and gave the new customer 10 bucks, we were cutting costs in half. Why depend on heuristics rather than rules? Because you’re looking for an edge that distinguishes you from other competitors, who are following conventional wisdom. That’s not to say that there aren’t rules. Don’t allow anyone to embezzle your money. That’s a rule. But it doesn’t give anyone a competitive edge.
有时，对正常规则的不了解反而让你具备竞争优势。例如，如果我们了解了PayPal早期的恶意信用卡欺诈和退款，我不知道我们会相信这样的服务可能会成功。我们没有意识到损失可能是多么惊人。所有的银行人员都知道这些规则 — 你必须首先防止欺诈。这阻止他们尝试像PayPal这样远程的东西。我们的无知使我们能够快速建立一些东西，但是当然，我们必须在运行中解决问题，因为我们已经在雷区了。大多数批评者认为，我们在2000年亏损了很多钱，由于客户获取的激励政策。但事实并非如此。这个行业通过广告获取客户的平均购买成本约为40美元。所以当我们给客户和客户推荐的朋友各10美金的时候，我们把成本削减了一半。为什么依赖直觉而不是规则？因为你正在寻找一个将你与其他竞争对手区分开的优势，而你的竞争对手遵循传统的智慧。这不是说没有规则。不要让任何人盗用你的钱。这是一个规则。但它并没有给任何人带来竞争优势。
It sounds as if your choice of heuristics can lead to radically different organizational outcomes.
听起来你依赖直觉的方式可以导致完全不同的组织结果。
Yes. One of the differentiators between Google and Microsoft, two blitzscaling companies, was that Google wanted to stay very flat, whereas Microsoft built up a lot of hierarchy.
是的。谷歌和微软都是闪电扩张的公司，但是两者之间的差异之一是，谷歌希望保持非常的偏平，而微软则建立了很多等级结构。
You had to have eight direct reports at Google to be a manager, but there was no upper limit. People had 10, 15, 20, even 100 direct reports to minimize middle management. It would likely have been more managerially efficient to give someone no more than eight people. However, Google chose a flat organization that sacrificed that kind of efficiency to achieve an extreme focus on technology development. Microsoft, on the other hand, followed a more classical and hierarchical approach.
在Google，你做为一个经理，必须有8个直接的汇报，没有上限。为了减少中间管理层级，有人可能有10个，15个，20个，甚至100个直接的汇报关系。从管理效率上讲，一个人的汇报不要超过8个。 但是Google选择了一个扁平的组织，牺牲了管理效率，以极大地关注技术开发。另一方面，微软采用了更为经典的分级的方法。
HBR：That reminds me of Google’s decision to hire only people with very high GPAs from elite universities. As a heuristic, there’s obviously collateral damage—there are many smart people you’re not allowed to hire—but it makes sense if your goal is to hire a large number of smart generalists quickly.
这让我想起Google决定只雇用精英大学GPA非常高的人。作为直觉，这有明显的副作用 — 有许多聪明的人不能被雇用 — 但如果你的目标是快速招聘大量的聪明通才，这是有道理的。
That created a lot of frustration. “I can’t hire my friend who doesn’t have that qualification, but I know that he’s really good.” And the company says, “Yeah, sorry. That’s the way we execute as we blitzscale. We need a simple heuristic so that we can focus on what really matters.” Another benefit of Google’s decision to hire only from elite universities is that it helped create and maintain a coherent culture as the company scaled.
这造成了很多挫折。 “我不能雇用我的朋友，他资格不符。但我知道他真的很好。” 公司说：“是的，对不起。这是我们闪电扩张采取的方式。我们需要一个简单的直觉方法，以便我们可以专注于真正重要的事情。“ Google决定仅从精英大学雇用的另一个好处是，当公司扩张的时候，有助于创建和维护一个连续的文化。
HBR：Why is culture so important to blitzscaling?
为什么文化对闪电扩张如此重要 ？
Because you’re growing an organization very fast, you have to make people accountable to each other on a horizontal or peer-to-peer basis, and not just vertically and top-down through the hierarchy.
因为你当你快速扩张一个组织的时候，你必须使人们在一个水平上或点对点的基础上彼此负责，而不仅仅是通过等级结构在垂直和自上而下的维度上。
HBR：What other heuristics are important as you go from, say, village to city?
从村庄规模到城市规模，有什么其他直觉是非常重要的呢？
Specialization at all levels becomes more important. You need to understand how to run a large-scale engineering department, for example, and how to deploy a significant amount of capital in marketing. You need dashboards and analytics and metrics for those functions as much as you need them to help you understand customers and the marketplace.
各个层级的专业化变得越发重要。例如，你需要了解如何运行一个大型工程部门，以及如何在营销中花费大量资金。你需要使用仪表板、分析参数和指标帮助你了解客户和市场。
You also need to have much higher reliability; sometimes the inefficiency that you accepted as you blitzscaled through the village stage is no longer tenable at a larger scale. You have to hire people who know how to make sure that your site is never down. And you have to be more careful in your release of engineering product. As a result, you have less adaptability. For example, Facebook famously shifted from a mantra of “Move fast and break things” to “Move fast with stable infrastructure.” You also move from a single-threaded organization to a multi-threaded one, allowing the company to focus on more than one thing at a time. When you’re in a tribe, everybody is attuned to one priority. In a village, you’re likely to start focusing on the thing that you’re going to scale. You’re also beginning to think about side experiments—for example, building developer tools, or experimenting with marketing or other paid acquisition. And you’re likely adding new functions, like corporate development to consider acquisitions. All of this rolls up to your macro goal of succeeding as a company, but as you move from village to city, functions are beginning to be differentiated; you’re really multi-threading. Companies at the city scale usually have more than one main product. They may have one central revenue stream, such as Google’s AdWords or Microsoft Office, but several different products. They’ve built an architecture that determines how the products relate to each other. And each product can be multi-threaded as well. Most Silicon Valley firms go global as they move from village to city, but some are global from Day One. At LinkedIn, we launched with 15 countries on our drop-down list. By the second day, we were getting e-mails from people whose countries were not on the list. It was an interesting geographic lesson for me, because I wasn’t aware that the Faroe Islands was a country until we got a complaint. So I went and read a little history and said, OK, add it to the list. It’s real.
你还需要具有更高的可靠性；有时候，你闪电扩张通过村庄阶段时接受的低效率到了更大规模时候就不再有效了。你必须聘请知道如何确保网站永不宕机的人。您在发布工程产品时必须更加小心。因此，你的可适应空间会变小。例如，众所周知Facebook从“快速移动，实现突破”的口号转变为“快速移动，架构稳定”。此外，你也从单线程组织转向多线程组织，允许公司同事不只专注于一件事情。 当你在一个部落的时候，每个人都集中到一个优先级的事情上。在一个村子里，你可能会开始关注你要扩张的事情。你也开始考虑其他的实验，例如构建开发人员工具，或尝试营销或其他付费获客。你可能会添加新的业务功能，例如增加企业发展部来考虑收购。所有这一切，都是为了实现公司成功的宏伟目标，但随着你从村庄转移到城市，职能开始有所区别；你真的是多线程了。 城市规模的公司通常有不止一个主要产品。他们可能有一个中央收入来源，例如Google的AdWords或Microsoft Office，但有几种不同的产品。他们建立了一种可以确定产品之间如何相互关联的架构。并且每个产品也可以是多线程的。大多数硅谷公司在从村庄迁移到城市规模的时候走向全球市场，但有些则是第一天开始就是全球化的公司。在LinkedIn，发布的时候，我们的下拉列表上就有15个国家。到了第二天，我们就收到来自国家不在名单上的人的电子邮件。对我来说这是一个有趣的地理课，因为我不知道法罗群岛是一个国家，直到我们收到投诉。所以我去读了一点历史，然后把它添加到了列表里面。它是真实的。
不同实力的公司是不是使用不同的剧本？
Yes. For example, Google developed two device operating systems simultaneously: Android and Chrome. When Google acquired Andy Rubin and his start-up, Android Inc., Andy was set up as an entrepreneur within Google, focused on this experiment, and accountable to Larry Page. From Google’s corporate resources perspective, it was a matter of asking Andy what he needed to make the project work.
是的。例如，Google同时开发了两个设备操作系统：Android和Chrome。当Google收购了Andy Rubin和他的创业公司Android Inc.时，Andy被当做是Google内部的创业家专注于这次实验，并对Larry Page负责。从Google的企业资源的角度来看，只要项目能成，Andy需要什么都会得到保证。
Andy wanted Android to stay cohesive and focused. So for example, only Android employees’ badges would grant access to the Android office; general Google employees couldn’t get in. The Android team didn’t run its software through Google’s standard code review process. Andy also wanted to be able to cut different deals with mobile operators—whatever it took to get his project off the ground—without a cross-check. In a completely different initiative, Chrome was developed in C++ (Android was developed in Java) and focused on laptops and browsers, rather than phones. Google could have handled that differently, by bundling Android and Chrome into one project, coherently attacking the device OS opportunity. But it chose instead to multi-thread, hiring the best person for the project, giving him the tools to get the job done, and letting him run a completely separate project and develop his own playbook.
Andy希望Android保持连贯和专注。例如，只有Android员工的徽章才能授予对Android办公室的访问权限; 一般的Google员工无法进入。Android团队开发的软件不通过Google的标准代码审查流程。 Andy还希望能够与不同的移动运营商达成不同的交易，无论什么代价只要能让他的项目起飞 — 无需公司再确认。在一个完全不同的计划中，Chrome是以C ++开发的（Android是由Java开发的），专注于笔记本电脑和浏览器，而不是手机。 其实Google也可采取不同的方式处理这种情况，将Android和Chrome捆绑到一个项目中，更协同一致地进攻设备操作系统的机会。但是，它选择了多线程，雇用了这个项目的最佳人选，给他工具完成工作，让他运行一个完全独立的项目，并开发自己的剧本。
我听到你问的有一个问题是，你能忽略什么？或许，这个问题的另一面是：在每一个阶段，什么是最重要的问题？
One of the metaphors that I use for start-ups is, you throw yourself off a cliff and assemble your airplane on the way down. If you don’t solve the right problem at the right time, that’s the end. Mortality puts priorities into sharp focus.
对于初创公司，我经常使用的比喻之一是，你把自己从悬崖上扔下来，在下降的过程组装你的飞机。如果您在正确的时间没有解决正确的问题，游戏就结束了。死亡率取决于你的专注程度。
When you’re blitzscaling, a whole bunch of things are inevitably broken, and you can’t work on them all at once. You have to triage. You fix the things that will get investors to give you more cash. The lift that capital provides means you have a longer time in the air to get things right. You’re unlikely to get your plane to fly on your first capital lift or even your second. A general principle of management is that if you have team dynamics problems, you fix them right away. But in blitzscaling, you’re adding those challenges all the time. And you’re moving so fast that today’s problems aren’t going to be the same as tomorrow’s. The operation is always patched together and kind of ugly and held together with duct tape. So maybe you ignore the team’s dysfunction for a while.
当你进行闪电扩张时，一大堆东西不可避免地出问题，你不可能一下子解决所有问题。你必须分类。你要修复投资者关心的问题，这样可以拿到更多的钱。资本提供的支持意味着你在空中有更长的时间把事情做对。你不可能让你的飞机在你获得第一次资本甚至第二次资本支持后就可以飞行。管理的一般原则是，如果你有团队问题，你应该马上修复他们。但是，在闪电扩张中，你一直在增加这些挑战。你的移动如此之快，今天的问题不会和明天一样。各种操作总是贴在一起，用牛皮胶带缠缠补补。所以，即使团队一段时间不能正常运转，你也要忽略。
For example, your engineers might be unhappy. You think, Should we build development tools to help them be more productive? Should we allocate a bunch of our engineers to make that happen? But you know that the size of the team will continue to change radically; any tools you create today are going to be obsolete. So you don’t try to solve that problem yet, even though you know that ignoring it will breed organizational unhappiness and that people will be frustrated. In nonblitzscaling circumstances those kinds of issues might be a top priority, but when you’re blitzscaling, sometimes you have to just let them burn. Remember, even if you do solve the problem, it will most likely stay solved only for a short time.
例如，你的工程师可能不满意。你会想，我们应该建立开发工具来帮助他们更有成效吗？我们应该分配一堆我们的工程师来实现这一点吗？但是你知道团队的规模会继续发生根本变化，你今天创建的任何工具都将被淘汰。所以你不要试图解决这个问题，即使你知道忽略它会使组织不快乐，让人们会感到沮丧。在非闪电扩张情况下，这些问题可能是首要任务，但是当你进行闪电扩张时，有时你必须让它们燃烧。记住，即使你解决了这个问题，它很有可能只是在很短的时间内貌似被解决了。
HBR：Can you alleviate unhappiness by telling people why you’re making certain decisions?
你能告诉人们你为什么做出某些决定的原因从而缓解他们的痛苦吗？
Yes, but only to a limited extent. What really keeps it all together is the perception that you’re moving at high speed because you’re growing something big, and that you’re going to be part of something successful. Almost every blitzscaling org that I have seen up close has a lot of internal unhappiness. Fuzziness about roles and responsibilities, unhappiness about the lack of a clearly defined sandbox to operate in. “Oh my God, it’s chaos, this place is a mess.” The thing that keeps these companies together—whether it’s PayPal, Google, eBay, Facebook, LinkedIn, or Twitter—is the sense of excitement about what’s happening and the vision of a great future. Because I’m part of a team that’s doing something big, I’ll work through my local unhappiness. Sure, I’d like a tidier sandbox, I’d like to be more efficient, I’d like the organization to be run more smoothly. But I’m willing to let it go because the pain will be worth it.
是的，但是只能有限的程度上。真正保持大家在一起的是信念，即你们正在高速运转，因为你们正在创造一些伟大的东西，而且你将成为成功的一部分。我近距离看到的几乎每个闪电扩张的公司内部都有很多不快乐。对于角色和责任的模糊，对于缺乏在明确定义的边界里操作。 “哦，我的上帝，真是混乱，这个地方是一团糟”。让这些公司在一起的东西 — 无论是PayPal，Google，eBay， Facebook，LinkedIn或Twitter — 是对于正在发生的事情的兴奋，对于伟大的未来愿景的兴奋。因为我是一个做伟大事情的团队的一部分，我会努力解决我的不快乐。当然，我想要一个更边界分明的沙箱，我想要更有效率，我希望组织运行更顺利。但是，我愿意牺牲这些，因为痛苦是值得的。
